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1 The Model
Suppose a society divided in two groups, the old (o) and the young (y).
There is no heterogeneity within these groups so that every old and every
young are the same. Every individual has a total amoount of hours (T )
which must be divided between hours of work (the so-called market activ-
ities) and leisure (non-market activities), such as housework, babysitting
and so on. Every individual gets utility from the consumption of leisure
(l) and all the other goods (c). Indeed, every worker’s problem is to find
the optimal combination of leisure and consumption which maximizes his
utility. I assume that the utility function is quasi-linear, so that the income
effect is canceled out, and may be written as:
U i = ci + ψi
√
li (1)
where ci denotes the consumption of all the other goods and ψi is a para-
meter which capture workers’ preferences for leisure, ψi ∈ [0, 1]. I assume
also that this parameter is higher for the old than for the young; that is:
ψo > ψy. Figure 1 shows a map of indifference curves when the parameter ψ
is particularly low, whilst Figure 2 shows a map of indifferent curves when
the parameter ψ is particularly high.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
It can be seen that indifference curves depicted in Figure 1 are flatter than
those depicted in Figure 2, which means that in the second case the individ-
ual has a greater preference for leisure. to solve the maximization problem
we need a suitable espression for the budget constraint which I write as:
ci = wi(1− τ i)(T − li) (2)
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where li denotes the number of hours of leisure, wi is the unitary wage per
hour, τ i the marginal tax rate on labour. Figure 3 and 4 show the equilib-
rium bundle of hours of leisure and consumption where an indifference curve
is tangent to the budget constraint.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
It can be seen that the equilibrium for the old, depicted in Figure 3 is charac-
terized by a higher number of hours worked and a lower level of consumption
than the equilibrium for the young depicted in Figure 4. Calculating the
Marginal Rate of Substitution between consuption and leisure, we obtain
dU i = dCi +
ψi
2
√
li
dli
and setting dU i we obtain:
dCi +
ψi
2
√
li
dli = 0 ⇒ dC
i
dli
= − ψ
i
2
√
li
Espression 4 represents the slope of the indifference curve. Finally the MRS
is
MRSCi,li = −
dCi
dli
=
ψi
2
√
li
(3)
which depends on ψi. That is, the higher ψi, the higher the rate at which
the worker is willing to substitute leisure with consumption
2 Comparative Statistics
2.1 Difference in wage rates
At first, suppose that workers are paid according to their productivity; that
is MPLi = wi. Secondly suppose that a group of workers (say group i) is
more productive than another (say group -i); for instance, one may imagine
that group i is represented by high-skilled workers and group -i by low-skilled
workers, or that group i is represente by the young and the group -i by the
old, even though the second case has not general acceptance amongst econo-
mists. Thus, wages are differentiated and the young get a higher wage rate
(wi > w−i). How does this differentiation in wages affect the equilibrium
bundle?
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Figure 5 depicts a situation where both the equilibrium for the group i and
group -i are present. The budget contraint of the old has a lower slope due
to the lower wage rate. As a result, the equilibrium of the old is charac-
terised by a higher level of leisure and a lower level of consumption than the
equilibrium of the young.
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2.2 Difference in marginal tax rates
The introduction of a marginal tax on labour reduces the wage rate. Suppose
the existence of a proportional tax levied on the gross wage and assume that,
again, one group is taxed more than another, ceteris paribus. The group
which suffer from the higher tax rate has an equilibrium characterized by a
higher level of leisure and a lower level of consumption.
3 The decision to retire
Suppose now that an old worker has to decide between working and retir-
ing. If he works he earns wi(1 − τ i)(T − li), whilst if he retires he gets a
pension transfer equal to bi. How can the existence of this option influence
the decision to retire? Figure 6 and 7 shows this situation.
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
It is easy to see that the different preferences of individuals for leisure
entail different equilibrium. In the first case (Figure 6) the worker decides to
work, whilst in the second (Figure 7) he decides to retire and the equilibrium
is characterized by a corner solution.
3.1 An increase in the pension benefit
An increase in the pension benefit exacerbate the retirement choice. Figure
8 shows the new equilibrium.
[FIGURE 8 HERE]
Comparing the situation depicted in figure 8 with the situation depicted in
figure 6 it is possible to see that, under the new pension benefit the same
individual who decide not to retire previously, retires now. This simple
example demonstrate how different pension policies selected by Government
may drive individuals’ decision to remain or to withdraw from the labour
force.
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